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Contents	
Japan - South Korea: Aid Dispute Resolved	3
Kampuchea-Vietnam: Dry Season Fighting .	
USSR-Vatican: Conciliatory Remarks	
West Germany: Setbacks for Moderate Social	Democrats 5
Zimbabwe: Antidissident Operations	6


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


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JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Aid Dispute Resolv	ed
Prime Minister Nakasone will visit Seoul n that Japan and South Korea have solved their aid dragged on since mid-1981.	
The US Embassy in Seoul says Japan \$4 billion in economic assistance over a period. Official development assistance \$1.85 billion, with the remaining amount from the Export-Import Bank. Tokyo has the normal 15-percent downpayment on purwith the credits.	seven-year will be in credits agreed to waive
Comment: Resolution of the aid issone of several efforts by Nakasone to mallongstanding problems early in his admin made several concessions to solve the diwaiving the downpayment requirement on o	ue concludes ke progress on istration. Japan spute, including
For his part, President Chun accepted less than the original \$6 billion requestingness to compromise suggests he is now carefully to his moderate foreign policy wants to take advantage of the current Jament's favorable attitude toward closer in the contraction of the current	ted. His will- listening more experts and apanese Govern-
Although the loans are not critical will improve South Korea's debt situation prospects. In addition, Nakasone's visities first foreign trip will enhance Chun international prestige.	n and growth t to Seoul on
The resolution of the aid issue, the leading South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jaresumption of Japanese-Korean talks at the tary level last month indicate continued relations is likely.	ung, and the he parliamen-

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5 January 1983



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KAMPUCHEA-VIETNAM: Dry Season Fighting		
The Vietnamese have strengthened their for guerrilla bases in western Kampuchea, and clashed non-Communist guerrillas in recent months suggest aggressive during the current dry season.	s initiated by	25X
An estimated two battalions of Viets supported by artillery counterattacked not insurgent positions near Thailand last we have a supported by artillers are the viets of the v	ew non-Communist eek tnamese recap-	25X 25X
tured several small villages near Nong Cl base of the Khmer People's National Libe	han, a major ration Front.	
Over the past several months Front in Nong Chan have carried out several successful hiteagainst nearby Vietnamese positions. The	and-run attacks e Front is short	25X
of ammunition and manpower, however, and hold newly gained positions.	<u>is unable</u> to	25 X
Comment: Front forces would be no revietnamese regimental-size attack against The Vietnamese are in a better position rethe guerrillas' main forces.	t Nong Chan.	25X
A Vietnamese attempt to overrun Nong Front bases along the border could lead t the Thai.	g Chan or other to clashes with	25 X
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USSR-VATICAN: Conciliatory Remarks

A Soviet television commentator on Monday claimed charges of Moscow's involvement in the assassination attempt on the Pope are intended "to set Catholics against Communists." He asserted the effort would fail and Catholics and Communists would fight together against the "military threat to peace."

Comment: In taking this conciliatory line, the commentator backed away from the intemperate criticism of the Pope in Soviet media last week and implicitly acknowledged Vatican efforts supporting disarmament. The earlier, more harsh remarks may have been intended by the Soviets to show that such allegations would not deter them from criticism of what they consider to be papal meddling in Eastern Europe. The latest commentary, however, suggests they now realize their criticism undermined both their denials of complicity in the assassination attempt and their efforts to influence the "peace" movement in Western Europe.

WEST GERMANY: Setbacks for Moderate Social Democrats

Local Social Democratic Party organizations have refused to renominate the leader of the moderately conservative "Kanalarbeiter" faction and the party's parliamentary foreign policy spokesman as candidates for the Bundestag in the election likely to be held on 6 March. Party regulations make it almost impossible for anyone not nominated by a local district to win a seat in the Bundestag. The spokesman attributes his defeat to his refusal to moderate his support of the dual decision by NATO on INF.

Comment: These actions will worry other moderate Bundestag deputies and could influence many Social Democrats to qualify their support for the INF decision. With the election campaign about to begin, party leaders probably are concerned over the extent of local opposition to the national party's policies. Weakened party discipline could easily allow conflicts between leftist and conservative factions to expand.

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5 January 1983

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
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*The Ndebele constitute approximately 16 percent of the total population of Zimbabwe.

ZIMBABWE: Antidissident Operations	
Prime Minister Mugabe has ordered military operations against dissidents in Matabeleland, the stronghold of Zimbabwe African People's Union leader Joshua Nkomo. The move is in response to a recent surge of indiscriminate attacks by dissidents. Six whites from farming families have been killed and over 20 persons injured.	25X1
Comment: The operation—which the press calls the largest since independence—is aimed at reassuring whites, especially farmers, who are vital to Zimbabwe's troubled economy. Mugabe also wants to placate hardliners in the cabinet who have called for retribution against Nkomo and his followers. The dissidence, however, results from resentment of the government by the Ndebele tribal minority. Excesses by troops, as have occurred in the past,	
would further increase opposition to Mugabe.	25X1

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